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Islam and Bourdieu. 
 
I want to concentrate on Bourdieu’s first book – Sociologie de l’Algérie, published in 1958 – and 
to explore two related aspects, firstly, the nature of his treatment of or discussion of Islam in this 
text, and, secondly, the methodological or philosophical tension in his work as he tried to 
balance the implications of the legacy of both Durkheimian and Weberian social science.  The 
common theme is the question:  how far did Bourdieu’s developing conceptual framework 
enable him to understand or appreciate the significance of Islam in Algerian social organisation 
and in Algerian politics?  There will not be time to carry through the implications of this 
question to the present, but, clearly, I am wanting to see this examination as a case-study for 
considering the capacity of the positivist tradition of social science to understand the influence 
of religion in contemporary politics. 
 
I shall be looking closely at the text of Sociologie de l’Algérie and so I need to remind you at 
once of some textual details.  Sociologie de l’Algérie was first published in 1958 as No. 802 in 
the “Que sais-je?” series of the Presses Universitaires de France.  A new edition – ‘entirely 
reviewed and corrected’ – was published in 1961 in the same series and by the same publishers.  
This second edition went through to an 8th edition, published in 2001, when, I think, it was 
superseded by a new text in the series with the same title by another author.  It was this second 
edition which was translated by Alan C.M. Ross and published, in 1962, as The Algerians, by 
Beacon Press, Boston, with a preface by Raymond Aron, and simultaneously published in 
Canada.  I shall be working from the 1958 text.  Where I quote passages which are retained in 
the English translation, I shall use that translation.  Where passages are not retained or are 
altered, I shall make my own translation and, where necessary, I shall hope to draw attention to 
any significance that there might be in the nature of the changes. 
 
The 1958 text starts with a one-page Introduction of two paragraphs. The first paragraph is 
consigned to a footnote on the first page of the new Introduction of the second edition, while the 
second paragraph is dropped altogether.  Both paragraphs are important in announcing 
Bourdieu’s intentions and in indicating his sensitivity to methodological issues.  The first 
paragraph reads: 
 
“It is obvious that Algeria, when considered in isolation from the rest of the Maghreb, 
does not constitute a true cultural unit.  However, I have limited my investigation to 
Algeria for a definite reason.  Algeria is specifically the object of this study because the 
clash between the indigenous and the european civilizations has made itself felt here with 
the greatest force.  Thus the problem under investigation has determined the choice of 
subject.  This study, which is a conceptual outline of more extensive analyses, includes a 
description of the original social and economic structures (chap. I to VI) which, although 
not the main purpose of the book, is indispensable for an understanding of the 
breakdown of the social structures caused by the colonial situation and the influx of 
European civilization.” (Bourdieu, 1958, 5; 1961, 5; 1962, xi)  
 
This is completely explicit.  Bourdieu was wanting to give an account of the status quo ante of 
Algerian social and economic structures in order to analyse the effects of the colonial situation 
and the process of acculturation, even though he was aware that Algeria was in the process of 
constituting itself as an independent state and, therefore, in the status quo ante, had not existed 
as such, either as a political state or, as he says, a true cultural unit.  Implicitly, there is a 
recognition that the coincidence between political states and cultural units is itself theoretically 
problematic.  The important point is that the substance of the 1958 text was an attempt to 
provide an account of the ‘original’ social and economic structures of a relatively indeterminate 
cultural unit.  For someone who had not been trained at all as a sociologist, this was a first 
attempt to offer a ‘sociology’ of a phenomenon which was not yet either a coherent society or a 
coherent political state. 
 
The paragraph which was not retained reads: 
 
“Any other intention than that of revealing the process which has led to the current state 
of affairs would in no way benefit the disinterest and impartiality which must inspire 
these researches.  Objective and temperate representation is neither evasion nor 
resignation when it provokes us into becoming aware of facts which, because they are 
human facts, contain within themselves their own meaning and value.” (Bourdieu, 1958, 
5). 
 
This comment is indicative of the position which Bourdieu was to elaborate in his 
methodological introduction to Part I of Travail et Travailleurs en Algérie, called “Statistiques 
et sociologie”, in which he insisted that the attempt to describe a situation scientifically or 
objectively was not an evasion of engagement but, instead, a contribution to cross-cultural 
understanding because, in the social sciences, this relies on common, shared human values.  
There is a trace here, not only of Bourdieu’s distrust of Sartrean ideological engagement, but 
also of some unarticulated commitment to the assumptions underlying Raymond Aron’s 
interpretation of Weber’s historical and hermeneutic philosophy of social scientific explanation. 
 
The main point about Bourdieu’s original introduction is that, as someone who had been trained 
in philosophy rather than as a sociologist, he was wrestling with the conceptual difficulties of 
trying to describe the complexity of any given society.  The first chapter of the 1958 text was 
entitled:  “Continuité et contrastes”.  This title is dropped in the 1961 edition, but the text is 
retained with almost no change as the Introduction to the new edition.  Bourdieu begins by 
highlighting the diversity of the Maghreb, whilst wanting to pose the question whether the 
diversity conceals an underlying, prevalent unity.  This is Bourdieu’s summary of the diversity: 
 
“There are so many criteria, so many lines of cleavage that rarely coincide, so many 
cultural areas that overlap.  For example, according to climate and topography, there is 
contrast between the Tell coastal region and the ‘Sahara,’, between mountain dwellers 
and the inhabitants of the plains and hills.  According to the way of life, contrast exists 
between nomads and sedentary peoples, but with varying intermediate degrees of semi-
nomads and semi-sedentary peoples.  According to the type of habitation, there is 
opposition between those who live in different types of dwellings:  terraced houses in the 
Saharan Aurès and Mzab, houses with tiled roofs in Kabylia, Moorish houses in the 
cities, but again with a series of transitional types, of which one of the most common is 
the humble earthen gourbi;  opposition between the grouped dwelling places of the 
people that have only recently become sedentary.  According to the anthropological 
criterion, one finds antithesis between the local stock and the additions from the east (but 
a checkered history has brought about such a great intermingling that opne can rarely and 
with difficulty distinguish any perfectly pure types).  According to language and culture, 
opposition exists between Berber-speaking and Arabic-speaking peoples, but among the 
latter are a great many Arabicized Berbers.  According to different culture traits, such as 
women’s rights of inheritance, there is antithesis between Berber and Moslem law, but 
on both sides a system of counteracting balances which tends to abolish these 
differences.  According to the degree of legislative power of the group, there is a similar 
opposition, but with transitions of varying degree.  According to artistic techniques, you 
discover contrast between the bold, rectilinear ornamentation of Berber art and the fine, 
flowing lines of Arab decoration.  One could go on in this way contrasting the 
sharecroppers and the wage earners, the varying relationship of man to the soil, the 
magic-religious nature of the oath, the judicial system, the degree of penetration of 
Islam.  All these lines traced on a map would form an almost inextricable maze, since no 
two marked areas would overlap exactly …”  (Bourdieu, 1958, 7-8;  1961, 5-6;  1962, xi-
xii). 
 
I want to make a few points from this passage.  The first is that Bourdieu’s uncertainty arises 
from an unwillingness to decide about the relative status of different kinds of distinction, 
particularly the relative status of what we might call social and anthropological distinction and 
the status of cultural distinction.  To put this differently, Bourdieu comes across as uncertain 
about the boundaries or demarcations between distinctions which can be said to be objective and 
those which can be said to be socially constructed.  There seems to be an underlying disposition 
to regard physical geography or topography as the strongest determinant of social and cultural 
differences, influencing the differences between sedentary and nomadic tribes, but these are 
reinforced by social constructs which have varying degrees of objective immutability – 
differences of habitation, of urban or non-urban existence, of art forms and, specifically for our 
attention today, of religion.  This brings me to my second main point which relates to the brief 
references in this passage to Islam.  Bourdieu makes nervous category distinctions.  At one 
point, he comments on the ethnic variety of the population.  This is a differentiation which can 
be made, as he puts it, ‘according to the anthropological criterion’.  He follows this by saying 
that ‘according to language and culture’, there is opposition between Berber and Arab speaking 
peoples and then specifies to say that ‘according to different culture traits’ there is antithesis 
between Berber and Moslem law.  The example of this antithesis is the difference in attitude 
towards ‘women’s right of inheritance’.  Bourdieu’s philosophical sympathy with 
phenomenology which I talked about at the UEL seminar meant, I think, that he was inclined 
to resist the pursuit of causal explanation, but there remained the problem of the relative weight 
that he should assign to physical geography, ethnic diversity, law, political and social 
organisation, and religion in seeking to understand the behaviour of the inhabitants of the land 
mass that was labelled Algeria.  
 
If a differentiation between Berber and Moslem law was one aspect of diversity within Algeria, 
Bourdieu also argued in this introductory chapter, that Islam could also be regarded as one of the 
unifying forces.  He listed factors which countered the tendency towards social particularity in 
different parts of the country.  These were: 
 
“… the intense movement that animates the whole territory, the migration of shepherds, 
the cycle of markets which are the occasion for cultural and judicial exchanges (the role 
of the meddah comes to mind in this connection); the far-reaching influence of the cities 
which are centers of religious orthodoxy and Eastern civilization;  the unity of faith;  the 
fact that the many dialects use the one sacred language of the Koran as an implicit 
reference.” (Bourdieu, 1958, 9-10; 1961, 7-8; 1962, xiii) 
 
Even here, the unificatory function of Islam is presented as having three distinct characteristics.  
There is the double imposition of unity achieved institutionally by the domination of the cities 
and by their cultural allegiance to a religious orthodoxy derived from subordination to Eastern 
civilization.  There is the unity achieved in the population by the general sharing of religious 
faith, and, finally, there is the unification which is achieved by the general reference to a 
common language text.  Bourdieu does not appear to be prepared to comment on the relative 
status of what might be called these institutional, spiritual and cultural forms of religious 
influence. 
 
Obviously, I don’t have time to go into detail in analysing the whole of Bourdieu’s Sociologie de 
l’Algérie.  I simply want to highlight those points in his account where reference to Islam seems 
to have most significance.  The second chapter of the 1958 text, which was to become the first 
chapter of the 1961 edition, was entitled, in 1958, ‘La culture Kabyle’ and, in 1961, ‘Les 
Kabyles’ – a significant shift from an account of a ‘culture’ to an account of ‘people’ which was 
reflected in the adoption of The Algerians as the title of the English translation, rather than 
‘Sociology of Algeria’.  Bourdieu describes, first, the physical geography of Kabylia and the 
spatial organisation of its villages.  Writing in the present tense, he next describes the social 
structures of Kabylia, citing Lowie, Masquéray, and Berque.  The third section is devoted to the 
‘juridical system’.  There Bourdieu makes it clear, as he puts it, that ‘Kabyle law is one of the 
centres of dialogue between arabs and berbers’ (Bourdieu, 1958, 16, my translation).  There is a 
short discussion of the way in which Berber law defines itself in opposition to the language and 
spirit of the Koran.  In this discussion, Bourdieu cites G. Marcy and he also discusses 
theoretically the distinction between the two competing legal systems.  For this theoretical 
discussion, Bourdieu has recourse to distinctions articulated by Max Weber.  Bourdieu wrote: 
 
“We think of the distinction made by Max Weber between ‘material justice’ (Kadi 
Justiz), ‘which, directly applied to particular cases, operates in conformity with the 
sentiment of justice but is devoted to the arbitrary’ and ‘formal legality’ which judges 
according to norms, or again, between the ‘magic formalism’ of the judgement of the 
ancient Germans and the ‘rational formalism’ of Roman law.’  Although kabyle justice 
has some of the traits of a ‘constituted’ juridical system, such as reasoned cohesion and 
sometimes written codification, it appears rather as a justice of sentiment (honour, 
equity, etc.)” (Bourdieu, 1958, 20-21, my translation) 
 
This whole section is dropped from the 1961 text.  Instead, the new edition goes straight to the 
next section of the 1958 text which was devoted to ‘domestic organisation’ where Bourdieu 
discussed in detail the status of women as an indicator of the differences between Berber and 
Islamic law.  Bourdieu wrote: 
“The principal originality of the Kabyle system concerns the status of women.  Unlike 
Moslem law, which grants a woman the right to inherit, ab intestat, a third of the legal 
share, Berber law disinherits women by virtue of the agnatic principle, according to 
which the successional choice depends primarily on theh degree of kinship in the male 
line and exists to the exclusive profit of the male heirs.”  (Bourdieu, 1958, 22-3; 1961, 
14; 1962, 5) 
The Kabyles had in 1748 refused to obey Koranic law and had returned to their custom of 
disinheriting women, but Bourdieu points out that the apparent barbarity of male/female 
relations has to be understood in the context of the ‘absolute primacy of the family group, or, 
more precisely, of the agnatic group’ (Bourdieu, 1958, 23; 1961, 14; 1962, 7) and this 
contention is supported by a quotation from Bourdieu’s chief source about the Kabyles, 
Hanoteau and Letourneux, who had written in 1873 that  
“all the Kabyle institutions (political, administrative, civil …) converge on this single 
goal:  to maintain and develop the solidarity between the members of the same 
community, to give to the ‘group’ the greatest possible strength.” (cited in Bourdieu, 
1958, 23; 1961, 15; 1962, 8). 
Bourdieu goes on to argue that it is this sense of group solidarity amongst the Kabyles which 
enables them to retain their identity when they emigrate elsewhere.  He wrote: 
 
“The superior role of the group also appears clearly in the matter of emigration.  Indeed, 
if in North Africa those who emigrate for temporary periods are for the most part 
sedentary Berbers and particularly Kabyles, it is because the strong cohesion and the 
solidarity of the agnatic group guarantees to the emigrant that the family he has left 
behind on the communal property – which provides subsistence for each member of the 
group – will be protected in his absence by those of his male relatives who have 
remained on the land.  It is the thought of the family that sustains him during his exile, 
that inspires him to work desperately hard and save his money.  Finally, it has been noted 
that when they are joined together in france to form communities which are patterned on 
the family structure and which recreate that system of solidarity and mutual support 
which animates Kabyle life, the emigrants will undergo severe privation in order to send 
back to their families the greater part of their earnings.” (Bourdieu, 1958, 26; 1961, 17; 
1962, 11) 
 
The final section of the chapter on the Kabyles in the 1958 text is devoted to ‘’lived’ democracy 
and ‘constituted’ democracy’ which pursues, in relation to politics, the same argument as 
Bourdieu had advanced in relation to Kabyle law.  The 1961 text added more to this section, just 
as it had added more to the account of domestic organisation, but rather than pursue these 
detailed differences any further, I want to summarise the argument I am trying to make. 
 
I have distributed for you the bibliography which Bourdieu added at the end of the 1958 
text.  This was reproduced in the 1961 text and the English translation added a few details of 
available English translations of texts about Algeria whilst removing most of the methodological 
works cited by Bourdieu.  What I am wanting to show is that Bourdieu’s account of Algerian 
tribes and of Islam was methodologically experimental in that, as a non-sociologist, he tried to 
deploy the conceptualisations of canonical sociologists either directly or indirectly by using 
secondary sources in which conceptual orientations were incorporated.  This is why I have tried 
to be meticulous in mentioning Bourdieu’s citations or quotations.  The main examples of what I 
am talking about are, of course, Bourdieu’s direct use of Weber.  You will see that the 
bibliography includes Weber’s Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie.  This is Weber’s 
three-volume collection on the sociology of religion which was published in 1920 shortly after 
his death, the first volume of which contains the famous article on “The Protestant ethic and the 
spirit of capitalism”, and the second and third volumes of which contain, respectively, Weber’s 
sociological analyses of Buddhism and Hinduism in Volume II, and of Confucianism in volume 
III.  I shall come on to this in more detail in a moment, but the point is that Bourdieu was 
deploying Weber’s work in order to try to understand Algerian social organisation and the role 
of Islam at a time when Weber’s work was little known in France.  Raymond Aron had been one 
of the earliest and most influential advocates of Weber’s work, introducing it in his La 
sociologie allemande contemporaine, which was first published in 1935 and re-issued in 1950  
and 1966. In that text, Aron had been intent on explaining Weber’s methodology in opposition 
to the legacy in the French tradition of Comtist positivism and Durkheimianism, introducing 
Weber’s use of ‘ideal-types’ as instruments for understanding social historical reality in 
opposition to the positivist attempt to treat social phenomena as facts and to generate a system of 
abstract causal explanation of human behaviour.  For me, the interest of Bourdieu’s Sociologie 
de l’Algérie is that he was strategically deploying the opposed traditions of social science.  
Notably, for example, as we have just seen, Bourdieu’s account of Kabyle customary law is 
heavily dependent on orientations which were contained in Hanoteau and Letourneux and were 
fully articulated by Durkheim in his De la division du travail social, first published in 1893. The 
relevant section of chapter 6 in Durkheim’s text, entitled “Progressive preponderance of organic 
solidarity”, deserves to be quoted in full. As the title of the chapter implies, Durkheim argued 
that the original form of mechanical solidarity was that which he characterized as the ‘horde’ 
which then took progressively different forms.  He wrote: 
 
“We give the name clan to the horde which has ceased to be independent by becoming 
an element in a more extensive group, and that of segmental societies with a clan-base to 
peoples who are constituted through an association of clans.  We say of these societies 
that they are segmental in order to indicate their formation by the repetition of like 
aggregates in them, analoguous to the rings of an earthworm, and we say of this 
elementary aggregate that it is a clan, because this word well expresses its mixed nature, 
at once familial and political.” (Durkheim, 2004, 150; 1933, 175). 
 
Durkheim went on to claim that there was nothing hypothetical about this classification.  He 
continued: 
 
“Not only is there nothing hypothetical about this social type, but it is almost the most 
common among lower societies, and we know that they are the most numerous.  We 
have already seen that it was general in America and in Australia.  Post shows that it is 
very frequent among the African negroes.  The Hebrews remained in it to a late date, and 
the Kabyles never passed beyond it.” (Durkheim, 2004, 152; 1933, 177) 
 
As evidence for this last comment, Durkheim cited:  “Hanoteau and Letourneux, La Kabylie et 
les Coutumes kabyles, II, and Masquéray, Formation des cités chez les populations sédentaires 
de l’Algérie, ch. V.” – precisely two of the texts cited in Bourdieu’s bibliography.  Bourdieu 
does not mention Durkheim in Sociologie de l’Algérie, but my point is that his interpretation of 
Kabyle social organization is derived substantially from texts which had pre-dated Durkheim 
and had given Durkheim the raw material for constructing his conceptualisation of the transition 
from mechanical to organic solidarity.  Durkheim’s conception of mechanical solidarity paid no 
attention at all in The Division of Labour in Society to the social function of organized religious 
belief and Bourdieu followed this orientation in his account of the Kabyles, but I want to turn 
now to a chapter in which Bourdieu attempted to confront directly the phenomenon of Islam. 
 
 The fourth chapter of Bourdieu’s 1958 text, entitled ‘La Culture Mozabite’, which became, as 
chapter III, simply ‘Les Mozabites’ in the 1961 text and its translation.  Bourdieu added one new 
page to the 1961 edition and, characteristically, in other places altered the balance between 
passages in large and small font, but, otherwise, the texts are identical.  The chapter begins with 
a description of the physical geography of the region, of the torrid climate which supports only 
‘a precarious mode of existence, dependent on the torrential rains that cause the wadi to 
overflow every two or three years, requiring endless toil to wrest the water from the ground.’ 
(Bourdieu, 1958, 43; 1961, 35; 1962, 37).  This climatic precariousness stimulates social 
cohesion.  In other words, Bourdieu takes from human geographers the suggestion that there is a 
causal link between topography and form of social organization.  He writes: 
 
“Adaptation to the natural surroundings demands an extremely strong social cohesion, 
and one of the reasons why such a cohesion is required is to ensure the functioning of the 
marvelously clever system of irrigation and water supply:  …”  (Bourdieu, 1958, 44; 
1961, 36; 1962, 37) 
 
The use of the word ‘adaptation’ with biological connotations is supplemented here with the 
suggestion that the rational organisation of industry and commerce associated with the 
production and distribution of water is the means by which adaptation occurs.  Importantly, the 
English translation loses the force of the word used by Bourdieu in this context:  ‘marvelously 
clever system of irrigation’ is a translation of ‘l’organisation merveilleusement rationnelle du 
système d’irrigation’.  The translation loses the Weberian connotation of ‘rational organisation’.  
Bourdieu immediately points out, however, that the yield from the labour barely covers the costs 
of its production, and he quotes from Gautier (No. 21 on the bibliographic list) who wrote that 
‘The oases … could not long exist on their own resources.   The oases system is a vicious circle, 
a financial paradox, or, more accurately, a millionaire’s whim’ (Gautier, Moeurs et cout. Des 
Musulm., 56, cited in Bourdieu, 1958, 44; 1961, 36; 1962, 38).  This quotation gave Bourdieu 
his cue for the problem that he wanted to discuss, one might even say for the theoretical problem 
of which the consideration of the Mozabites was an exploration.  Bourdieu followed the 
quotation with the comment that  
 
 “We shall now attempt to explain the how and the why of this paradox.” 
 
The paradox to which Bourdieu refers is, in effect, that the socially cohesive exploitation of 
oases is not the consequence of a natural equilibrium of labour and productivity but of capitalist 
intervention possessing its own motivations.  The how and the why that Bourdieu wanted to 
explore was the how and the why of Mozabite capitalism.  For his explanation, Bourdieu clearly 
had recourse here to Weber’s ‘The Protestant ethic and the ‘spirit’ of capitalism’.  Bourdieu 
immediately offered an account of the ‘why’ of the paradox which he had highlighted: 
 
“The Mozabites are Kharedjite Abadhites (a sect of Islam), who owe their name to the 
fact that they formed a dissident group against Ali, the fourth caliph, son-in-law of the 
Prophet, in the name of two princuiples that they derived from a strict interpretation of 
the Koran, considered as the unique law to which nothing can be added or taken away, 
namely, that all believers are equal and that every action is either good or bad, arbitration 
as to the rightness or wrongness of these acts being allowed only in exceptional 
circumstances.  Thus these equalitarian rigorists, according to whom religion must be 
vivified not only by faith but also by works and purity of conscience, who attach great 
value to pious intention, who reject the worship of saints, who watch over the purity of 
morals with extreme severity, could be called the Protestants and Puritans of Islam.” 
(Bourdieu, 1958, 44-5; 1961, 36-7; 1962, 38). 
 
Weber’s ‘The Protestant Ethic and the ‘spirit’ of capitalism” had originally been published as an 
article in 1905.  The version included in volume 1 of the Gesammelte Aufsätze, which Bourdieu 
cites, was modified to some extent but, more importantly, that first volume began with a 
‘Vorbemerkung’ (Prefatory Remarks) in which Weber discussed the development of his 
sociology of religion from its beginnings in the analysis of Protestantism to the subsequent 
analyses of world religions.  In the first paragraph of these Prefatory remarks Weber wrote: 
 
“The child of modern European civilization [Kulturwelt] will inevitably and justifiably 
approach problems of universal history from the standpoint of the following problematic 
[Fragestellung]:  What chain of circumstances led to the appearance in the West, and 
only in the West, of cultural phenomena which – or so at least we like to think – came to 
have universal significance and validity?” (Weber, 2002, 356)  
 
The most significant of these specifically Western cultural phenomena was, of course, 
capitalism.  In tracing the development of his thinking, Weber made it clear that the purpose of 
the two older essays included at the beginning of the three volume collection was different from 
the final purpose of the collection as it emerged over time.  The first two essays, one of which is 
‘The Protestant ethic and the ‘spirit’ of capitalism’, attempt, according to Weber 
“… to approach, through one important individual point, the aspect of the problem which 
is usually most difficult to grasp:  the extent to which the emergence of an ‘economic 
disposition,’ the ‘ethos’ of an economic form, was determined by certain religious 
beliefs.  This will be demonstrated by reference to the example of the links between the 
modern economic ethos and the rational ethic of ascetic Protestantism.  Here we shall 
only pursue one side of the causal relationship.  The later essays on the ‘Economic Ethic 
of the World Religions’ attempt, in an overview of the relationships of the most 
important religions of civilization [Kulturreligionen] to the economy and social 
stratification of their environment, to pursue both causal relationships as far as it is 
necessary to find points of comparison with the development in the West, which we shall 
be exploring further.  Only thus is it possible to set about identifying more or less 
unambiguously the causal elements of the western religious economic ethic that, as 
distinct from others, are peculiar to it.” (Weber, 2002, 366-7). 
 
Put simply, Weber was saying in 1919 that his early work had been an attempt to analyse the 
effects of Protestant Christian beliefs on the emergence of Western capitalism, whereas his later 
work had become more interested in the social conditions of production of differing religious 
beliefs and then in the consequentially different forms of economic behaviour. 
 
I mention this in detail because I am suggesting that Bourdieu’s account of the Mozabites as 
heretical Islamists simply took over Weber’s analysis of the effects of christian protestantism 
without paying attention to the specificities of Islamic fundamentalism.  Weber, for instance, 
had devoted meticulous attention to the different consequences of Lutheran and Calvinist 
beliefs, the one emphasizing faith and the other works, whereas Bourdieu writes of the 
Kharedjite Abadhites without comparable discrimination, stating that for them ‘religion must be 
vivified not only by faith but also by works and purity of conscience’.  At the same time, 
Bourdieu made no attempt to analyse the local forms of Islam in the way that Weber had 
attempted in his later, comparative religious studies.  Bourdieu mentions that one of the 
characteristics of Mozabite society is that the survival of their cities is dependent on the 
temporary emigration of workers and entrepreneurs, and this then causes him to pose his ‘how’ 
question.  He does so in the following passage by asking typically Weberian questions: 
 
“… how has the cohesiveness of the whole been maintained against all the forces of 
dispersion?  How, moreover, have these rigorous Puritans been able to become 
financiers, specialists in big business and high finance, without disavowing their devout 
heterodoxy in any way?  How can a keen understanding of capitalist techniques be 
united in the same persons with the most intense forms of a piety that penetrates and 
dominates their whole life?  How is it that this religious society – tightly closed upon 
itself, anxious to assert itself as being different – has been able to participate in a 
completely modern economic system without letting itself be affected or impaired in any 
way and, at the same time, preserve its own originality intact? (Bourdieu, 1958, 45-6; 
1961, 37-8; 1962, 39) 
 
In trying to answer this question, Bourdieu touches on the influence of the city which reflects 
Weber’s interest in the extent to which the ethos of capitalism was reinforced by urban 
development as much as directly by belief systems.  Bourdieu follows this with a section which 
he actually calls ‘Puritanisme et capitalisme’ in which he comments that all the forces of 
dispersion inherent in Mozabite society are countered by 
 
“… the extremely vigorous pressure that the group exercises over all its members 
through the intermediary of its religious doctrine, through the cohesion caused by its 
intensely active religious life, through the constant presence of religious law in every act 
of life and in the hearts of all men, a religious law which is felt both as a rule of life 
imposed from without and as an inner guide to conduct.” (Bourdieu, 1958, 51; 1961, 43; 
1962, 45).  
 
Tacitly, the contrast which really interested Bourdieu was between the so-called ‘gentilitial 
democracy’ of the Kabyles in which social relations were organised on the basis of domestic or 
familial relations without reference to any constituted law of conduct, and the social organisation 
of the Mozabites in which cohesion seemed to be achieved on the basis of religious conviction 
and subordination to religious commandments. 
 
My main point today, therefore, is to suggest that Bourdieu’s account of Islam in his first book 
was not primarily a response to his observations of Islamic practices so much as an attempt to 
use and, perhaps, evaluate the opposing conceptualisations of Durkheim and Weber.  In brief, 
the rest of my argument would run in the following way. 
 
Many of the secondary texts which Bourdieu used in writing Sociologie de l’Algérie can be 
shown to be what Edward Said would call ‘orientalist’ texts.  Perhaps the work of both 
Durkheim and Weber could also be said to be orientalist.  I have argued many times that 
Bourdieu’s fieldwork in Algeria was stimulated by an essentially philosophical problematic 
concerning affective relations and processes of acculturation, and that, on returning to France, he 
spent the 1960s consolidating his reputation in Aron’s Centre de Sociologie Européenne as a 
sociologist pioneering his own version of the Western European sociological tradition.  It was 
only in the early 1970s when he had gained personal control over the Centre de Sociologie 
Européenne that he was able to reactivate his earlier phenomenological orientation to pose the 
question of the relationship between the non-reflecting, primary experience of people and the 
systems of objective explanation of these experiences offered by Western social scientists.  
During the 1970s, he revisited his Algerian work and, as early as Esquisse d’une théorie de la 
pratique (1972), was emphasizing the methodological necessity to carry out a second 
epistemological break which would entail a sociological analysis of the conditions of production 
of objectivist science.  Significantly, Bourdieu gave a paper entitled “Les conditions sociales de 
la production sociologique:  sociologie coloniale et décolonisation de la sociologie” in June, 
1975 at a colloque on “Ethnologie et politique au Maghreb”.  The re-writing of the 
‘translation’of Esquisse as Outline of a Theory of Practice, published in 1977; the publication of 
Algérie 60, structures économiques et structures temporelles in 1977; and the publication of Le 
sens pratique in 1980 were all different attempts to re-visit the work of the late 1950s which 
would exorcise the Western sociological gaze that I have tried to expose as present in Sociologie 
de l’Algérie.  Most of this was happening before the publication of Said’s book of 1978:  
Orientalism.  Western conceptions of the Orient.  In the Preface to Le sens pratique, Bourdieu 
went out of his way to discuss his intentions and the influences on those intentions when he first 
began to study Algerian tribes.  The whole Preface deserves close attention and, from our 
current point of view, not least because Bourdieu comments that it was the rediscovery of some 
of his own photographs which reminded him of how he had felt about the incongruity of 
attempting to analyse ritual practices during conditions of war.  Bourdieu argues, without using 
the word ‘orientalism’, that he had at first resisted analysing ritual because of the orientalist 
orientation of this kind of study, but he had become persuaded  
 
“… to try to retrieve it from the false solicitude of primitivism and to challenge the racist 
contempt which, through the self-contempt it induces in its victims, helps to deny them 
knowledge and recognition of their own tradition.” (Bourdieu, 1990, 3). 
 
In other words, Bourdieu’s initial response to orientalist interpretations of ritual was to attempt 
to analyse Algerian experiences materialistically.  Hence the analysis contained in Travail et 
travailleurs en Algérie of 1963 was on the one hand statistical and, on the other, based upon 
interviews which attempted to gauge cultural change solely in terms of changing experiences of 
work.  In my view, Algérie 60 perpetuates this approach in that Bourdieu sought to align his 
earlier work with arguments emerging in Development Economics and Development Studies.  It 
was essentially in Outline of a Theory of Practice that Bourdieu tried to retrieve indigenous 
experience in a sense that was much wider than in terms of labour.  However, my contention is 
that Bourdieu did not then have the raw material to allow for the possible expression of Islamic 
attitudes.  His derivative sociology of religion had been so objectivist in the late 1950s that he 
had never asked fieldwork questions about the consequences for social action of different forms 
of Islam amongst, for instance, the Kabyles or the Mozabites.  The retrieval of a materialist, non-
orientalist ethnography had no evidence to use to do justice to indigenous religious experience 
and in relation to our current world situation, this perhaps should be regarded a serious 
deficiency in Bourdieu’s early work and his incapacity to rescue that earlier work from the 
inadequacies of which he was aware. Having said that, I would nevertheless want to end by 
arguing that Bourdieu would not have allowed himself to be trapped into the kind of dualism 
which underlies Said’s analysis of orientalism.  Bourdieu’s second epistemological break does 
not negate the achievements of objectivism.  It relativises them by encouraging reflexivity.  
Amartya Sen has recently made this comment in relation to Said’s work: 
   
[Sen:  The Argumentative Indian.] 
 
I think Bourdieu’s methodology is one which can be deployed to understand situations 
pluralistically and, not least, to understand contemporary international religious and political 
relations.  The methodology which he developed had the capacity to enable cross-cultural 
understanding of religious convictions, but his earlier fieldwork preceded the development of 
this methodology such that he did not have the transcripts of interviews and conversations which 
would have made possible an analysis of the part played by Islam in indigenous Algerian 
culture.  In part, this is why it is so interesting that we do, nevertheless, have the photographic 
record of his visual perceptions at the time. 
 
 
Derek Robbins. 
 
  
